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Abstract. As pervasive environments become more commonplace, the privacy
of users is placed at increased risk. The numerous and diverse sensors in these
environments can record users’ contextual information, leading to users unwit-
tingly leaving “digital footprints.” Users must thus be allowed to control how
their digital footprints are reported to third parties. While a significant amount of
prior work has focused on location privacy, location is only one type of footprint,
and we expect most users to be incapable of specifying fine-grained policies for
a multitude of footprints. In this paper we present a policy language based on the
metaphor of physical walls, and posit that users will find this abstraction to be
an intuitive way to control access to their digital footprints. For example, users
understand the privacy implications of meeting in a room enclosed by physical
walls. By allowing users to deploy “virtual walls,” they can control the privacy
of their digital footprints much in the same way they control their privacy in the
physical world. We present a policy framework and model for virtual walls with
three levels of transparency that correspond to intuitive levels of privacy, and the
results of a user study that indicates that our model is easy to understand and use.
1 Introduction
As sensor-rich pervasive environments become more common, users’ privacy will be at
increased risk [16]. Sensors can record a user’s activities and personal information such
as heart rate, body temperature, and even conversations. Users may unwittingly leave
“digital footprints” (information about users derived from sensors) that can threaten
their privacy. These footprints can be disseminated to applications, or stored for later
retrieval, giving rise to useful context-aware applications. For example, applications can
involve direct queries from other users (“What is Bob doing now?”), triggers (“Alert
me when Bob is nearby”), or higher-level actions triggered by notifications (“Create
a virtual meeting when Alice and Bob are free in their offices”). Such applications
may be useful, but without adequate precautions, digital footprints may be accessed by
unwanted parties. While several proposed mechanisms protect location privacy, location
is just one kind of digital footprint, and these mechanisms do not directly apply to all
? This research program is a part of the Institute for Security Technology Studies and was sup-
ported by the Bureau of Justice Assistance under grant 2005-DD-BX-1091. The views and
conclusions do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Department of Justice. To
appear in International Conference on Pervasive Computing 2007, Copyright 2007 Springer.
types of footprints. As the number and variety of sensors grows, it will be cumbersome
for users to specify fine-grained policies about who can access which footprints.
We address one specific problem: the confidentiality of digital footprints, where we
define a digital footprint as contextual information derived from raw sensor readings. By
confidentiality, we mean that only authorized users should be able to access footprints
as defined by the user’s privacy policy. We believe that the term “digital footprints” is
more intuitive to lay users than “context,” since digital footprints evoke a sense of a
digital trail that a user may leave in the virtual world. We feel that users will be more
motivated to protect the privacy of their “digital footprints” rather than their “context.”3
We propose a policy framework based on the intuitive concept of “virtual walls”
that extends the notion of privacy provided by physical walls into the virtual realm. For
instance, users are aware of their physical privacy in a closed room — outsiders can-
not see or hear them. In a pervasive environment, however, their virtual privacy could
be quite the opposite. Digital footprints from a videocamera and a microphone could
expose their privacy in the virtual world, where other users can see and hear them by
accessing their footprints. Figure 1 shows a meeting room where Alice and Bob have
physical privacy, but sensors are disseminating personal footprints, such as their im-
ages and speech, to unwanted parties. Using virtual walls, users can “bolster” physical
walls by specifying intuitive policies that control access to all their personal footprints
in a way that is consistent with their notion of physical privacy. Virtual walls also re-
lieve the burden of specifying separate policies for several footprints, which would be
cumbersome in sensor-rich environments.
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Fig. 1. Alice and Bob are aware of their physical privacy within the meeting room, but
sensors are leaking personal footprints to the pervasive environment.
We define three levels of transparency for virtual walls: transparent, translucent,
and opaque, each with semantics that match what a user would expect in the physical
world. For example, Alice’s transparent virtual wall for a room allows users to “see” her
personal digital footprints through the wall. An opaque wall restricts the visibility of all
footprints within the room, including general footprints such as room temperature or hu-
3 The term “digital footprints” is not new. Its increasing use in the legal world [2,24] and the
popular media [23,27] highlights growing attention to the consequences of digital tracking.
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midity. A translucent virtual wall discloses general digital footprints to outsiders (peo-
ple are present, movement, etc.) while keeping the identities and personal footprints of
people hidden. This is similar to physical translucence, through which outsiders cannot
identify people, but can see general movement, light, occupancy, and so on.4 Figure 2
shows a translucent virtual wall that prevents reporting of personal footprints, but keeps
general footprints visible. To allow users to better control their privacy, we extend this
metaphor by allowing users to create different virtual walls for different queriers. For
instance, Alice could create a transparent wall around the cafeteria for her friends, but
a translucent wall for her professors. These walls allow her friends to see her personal
footprints, but disallow her professors from doing so. We validate the usability of our
model through a user study and show that users are indeed able to understand and use
our model to express privacy requirements.
This paper makes the following contributions:
A policy abstraction that is easy to understand and use. The metaphor of “virtual
walls,” validated by a user study, allows lay users to specify their privacy pref-
erences in a way that is consistent with their notion of physical privacy.
Addressing privacy in sensor-rich environments. Users control access to their foot-
prints without having to resort to fine-grained policies for each type of footprint.
A usable interface for specifying policies. We developed a prototype system, and
evaluated our graphical user interface (GUI) in a user study. The study validates
the ease of use of the GUI and provides valuable insights for further improvement.
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Fig. 2. Alice and Bob deploy a translucent virtual wall to prevent unwanted disclosure
of personal footprints.
Next, we outline our system architecture and then describe the virtual walls model in
Section 3. Section 4 describes a user study that tested our model and GUI. In Section 5
we discuss some challenges that would arise in a real deployment of virtual walls, and
suggest future work. Section 6 discusses related work, and Section 7 concludes.
4 It is arguably impossible to guarantee complete privacy for users — for example, Alice’s lo-
cation might be hidden while she is in a meeting room, but if Charlie observes Alice enter
the room, then her location privacy is compromised. Our goal, however, is to mirror Alice’s
expectations of privacy in the physical world, where she is already aware of such threats.
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2 Architecture
Our system consists of a context server, which collects and disseminates digital foot-
prints; clients, who instantiate walls or request footprints; and a sensing infrastructure
that extracts footprints from sensor inputs. Users instantiate virtual walls by contacting
the context server, which then uses the virtual walls to regulate access to footprints.
We use Solar [4] as the sensing infrastructure in our prototype system, but any such
service will do. Solar is an open publish/subscribe framework for processing and dis-
tributing contextual events in a pervasive environment. For example, a footprint regard-
ing Bob’s current activity can be derived from an accelerometer and body-temperature
sensors. Any higher-level inferences (made from raw sensor data) about users’ activi-
ties generated by the Solar framework are delivered to the context server as footprints
containing the activity (e.g., dancing or sleeping), a timestamp, and details about which
sensors were used.5 As we will see, the locations of sensors used to derive the footprint
are used to describe where a footprint “originated,” and footprint access is controlled in
part by their origin. Footprints are treated as soft state, and never recorded to persistent
storage. Users query the context server for the most recent footprints, and the footprints
are returned if allowed by the virtual walls protecting those footprints. Users create vir-
tual walls by using a GUI, which records the walls in a persistent database at the context
server. Figure 3 illustrates the architecture of our system with an example.
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Fig. 3. Alice sets up a translucent virtual wall for Room 123. Raw sensor data are re-
ported to the Solar framework, which generates higher-level footprints such as “Room
123 is occupied.” Access to footprints is regulated by the virtual walls for the room.
Quincy is granted access to general footprints within Room 123, but Quentin is denied
access to Alice’s personal footprints.
Our proposed virtual wall system requires various security assumptions:
5 Solar itself does not make any inferences from raw sensor data, but provides an architecture
to do so. We assume that footprints are generated by inferring user activities from raw sensor
readings [18,25].
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Trusted context server: All users trust the context server in terms of the confidential-
ity and integrity of their footprints. Only recent footprints are maintained, and only
in non-persistent storage, which limits the long-term privacy risk.
Secure location claims: Secure location claims, for instance using a location-limited
channel [22], are needed for the creation of opaque virtual walls (Section 3). The
location system thus needs to have a level of granularity that is able to identify
“places” such as rooms and hallways.
Sensor security: We assume that all sensors are approved by the administrators of the
system.We ignore sensors that are deployed by malicious users (e.g., hidden micro-
phones); virtual walls are intended to make pervasive environments more usable by
securing known devices. We also assume that sensors communicate with the system
over a secure channel that provides confidentiality and integrity of sensor data.
3 The Virtual Walls Model
We aim to keep the semantics of virtual walls as intuitive as possible, so that users who
specify virtual walls have a clear understanding of who can access their footprints. In
keeping with the metaphor of privacy afforded by physical walls, transparent virtual
walls allow queriers to access any footprints, even a user’s personal information (such
as their heart rate or whether they are speaking); opaque walls block access to all foot-
prints originating from within the wall; and translucent walls allow queriers to access
only general information such as room temperature and the presence of motion. To add
flexibility, users may create walls of varying transparencies for different queriers. For
example, Alice may create a transparent virtual wall around her dorm room that applies
to her friends and an opaque virtual wall that applies to her professors, thereby allow-
ing finer control over the dissemination of her footprints. In essence, virtual walls are a
means for users to specify discretionary privacy policies for their digital footprints.
3.1 The model
To define our model we must describe places, footprints, queries and virtual walls.
Places. We refer to physical spaces such as rooms and buildings as places. Places have
symbolic names, or labels, that are readily identifiable by users (e.g., “Room 251, Com-
puter Science Building”), and users may deploy virtual walls around these places. We
assume that physical areas are partitioned into non-overlapping or atomic places (e.g.,
a building is partitioned into distinct rooms), and users can define aggregate places that
map to multiple atomic places. Virtual walls can be defined for any atomic or aggre-
gate place. For example, Alice may specify a virtual wall around the “first floor” place.
Our system maps this request to multiple virtual walls around the set of atomic places
(rooms and hallways) on the “first floor.” We assume a set of predefined placesP and
that regions are well-specified, i.e., each has a correct label meaningful to all users. This
labeling allows users to specify virtual walls around recognizable places.
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Footprints originate from places. Digital footprints derived from sensor data taken from
place p are said to originate from place p, or places in set P ⊆P if they are gener-
ated from sensor data in different places or if an individual sensor covers more than
one place. For example, the footprint that describes Alice’s speech activity, inferred
from raw sensor readings taken in Room 251, is said to “originate in Room 251.” We
categorize footprints into two types: general, i.e., those footprints that do not reveal
identifiable information about people (such as room temperature), and personal, that
contain identifiable information (such as Alice’s heart rate). We assume that footprints
can be classified into one of these two categories, i.e., administrators or programmers
can categorize footprints when new footprint generators are defined in the system. Per-
sonal footprints contain identifying information about a set of one or more people. For
example, “Alice’s heart rate” contains information about Alice, and a camera image of
a room contains information about the people in that room. We call this set of people
the owners of the footprint, and the owners of a footprint decide the visibility of that
footprint. We assume a predefined set of users U to which an owner must belong.
Definition 1. A general footprint is a tuple f = 〈d,P, ts,v〉, where descriptor d is a
textual description of the footprint such as “Room temperature,” P ⊆P is the set of
places where the footprint originates, ts is the timestamp when the footprint was gener-
ated, and v is an object that represents the value of the footprint. A personal footprint
is defined with the same elements plus a set of owners O ⊆ U . Only an owner of a
personal footprint can regulate access to that footprint.
Definition 1 formalizes general and personal footprints. In these definitions we
do not concern ourselves with implementation details. Sophisticated implementations
would specify d with several attributes (e.g., with an ontology [21]). Our prototype
uses a simpler textual representation of d because efficient representation of footprints
is orthogonal to the privacy problem that we are addressing. Similarly, the value v of a
footprint can be implemented as different data types. Our implementation in Solar pro-
vides classes for various types of footprints, which are delivered as “events” in the Solar
framework. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that there is only one owner o of
a personal footprint, and explain group ownership of personal footprints in Section 3.2.
Footprints are categorized by their descriptor, origin, and owner if any. We refer to
these categories as “footprint IDs.” The footprint ID for a general footprint 〈d,P, ts,v〉
is the tuple 〈d,P〉. Likewise, the footprint ID for a personal footprint is 〈d,P,o〉. For
example the footprint 〈room temperature,{Room 241},16 : 42 : 01,72〉 has the footprint
ID 〈room temperature,{Room 241}〉. A personal footprint that infers whether Alice is
moving may have the ID 〈Movement,{Room 241},Alice〉. In our implementation, a
more recent footprint replaces an older footprint with the same ID and thus the context
server only maintains the most recent versions of footprints. Personal footprints are
expired from the system after a certain time period so that historical data about users are
not recorded. We note that our model can be extended to record historical information.
Query model. We assume that users can query footprints from the context server us-
ing any combination of the fields defined for a footprint: place, descriptor, timestamp,
owner, and value. For instance, Quentin could ask for a list of all footprints for a place
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(such as a conference room), and the context server would return a list of all footprints
to which he has access that originate within that place. Similarly, Quentin could query
Bob’s footprints, such as “Is Bob speaking?” or “Is Bob moving?” Complex descrip-
tors, as used in ontological databases, could enable more general searches. For exam-
ple, “What is Bob’s current activity?” could be mapped onto all footprints that measure
Bob’s activities such as his motion and speech footprints.
Virtual walls. Virtual walls protect the privacy of users by allowing them to control
the visibility of their personal footprints and general footprints in their vicinity. In our
implementation, users create virtual walls through a GUI. The context server records
walls in a persistent database and uses them to enforce the user’s access control policies.
Definition 2. A virtual wall w = 〈o, p, t,A〉 belongs to owner o and protects foot-
prints that originate in place p. We say that virtual wall w is around place p
(e.g., a virtual wall around Room 251). The virtual wall w has transparency t ∈
{transparent, translucent,opaque}. Based on the transparency t, the wall w controls ac-
cess to footprints originating in p from querying users A ⊆ U where U is the set of
users in the system. We call A the apply-set, since the wall w applies to users in A.
The semantics of transparency are as follows. The transparency t of virtual wall
w= 〈o, p, t,A〉 affects the reporting of digital footprints from place p to the set of users
in A. For any personal footprint fo for owner o and general footprint fg originating from
within the virtual wall w, a querier q
1. (if t = transparent) is allowed access to footprint fo only if q is in the apply-set A
(not “if,” because another wall may block access),
2. (if t = translucent) is denied access to footprint fo if q is in the apply-set A, or
3. (if t = opaque) is denied access to fo and fg if q is in the apply-set A.
Access to fg is granted in the absence of an opaque wall. We will discuss the default
behavior for access to fp in the absence of virtual walls further below, but in summary,
access to fp is denied by default, unless the owner (or all the owners) of the footprint
allows access with a transparent wall.
The creator of a virtual wall is the owner of that wall. For example the virtual wall
〈Alice,Room 256, translucent,{John,Andy,Jim}〉 is “Alice’s translucent virtual wall
around Room 256 that applies to her family,” or in other words, Alice’s family can-
not access her personal footprints originating in Room 256. We assume a GUI through
which users can define groups such as “Family,” which are mapped to multiple users,
such as {John, Andy, Jim}, by the system. Our prototype GUI contains this functional-
ity and allows users to define groups, although we did not test this in our user study.
Virtual walls affect access to the owner’s footprints; Alice’s translucent virtual wall
will protect her personal digital footprints, and not Bob’s personal footprints (since Bob
is not the owner of that wall). Our model allows different users to set up personal virtual
walls around the same place to control access to their own footprints, and each user
can create multiple walls for the same place. Section 3.3 discusses interaction between
virtual walls created by different users, and how conflicts between walls are resolved.
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Notice (in the above semantics) that transparent and translucent walls do not limit
access to general footprints that originate within the wall; these are freely available
to all users. This policy is based on our assumption that unidentified data do not usu-
ally threaten an individual’s privacy. For instance, the temperature or occupancy of a
publicly-shared place such as a cafeteria is unlikely to affect the privacy of people in
that place. For “personal spaces” such as one’s home or office, however, general in-
formation can be quite revealing — if Bob’s office is occupied (a general footprint),
then someone is in Bob’s office, most probably Bob. In such cases, users can create
opaque virtual walls around places where general footprints can result in a breach of
privacy. Note that users are already aware of such threats in the physical world (lights
on in an office indicate a user’s presence), and so an opaque virtual wall is an intuitive
countermeasure. Opaque walls may also be useful in public places. For example, if you
are known to be the only person who works in a lab after 2am, general footprints from
the lab may reveal your location. Since general footprints are not tied to any particu-
lar user, the owner of the opaque virtual wall is implicitly claiming ownership of the
general footprints within that wall. As this affects other users within the virtual wall,
we require unanimous consent from these users. In other words, Bob can freely create
opaque walls around a place (even if he is not present in that place), but requires the
consent of users present in that place. Section 3.3 discusses this issue in more detail.
In some cases a query may not have virtual walls controlling it, as it is unrealistic
to expect that users will specify walls for every possible place and querier. To prevent
the accidental release of personal footprints, we block access to personal footprints if
there are no virtual walls that apply to a query. In effect, the semantics defined above
protect such footprints by a ‘default’ translucent virtual wall, and users are informed
as such. Despite this default behavior, we believe users find it more useful to specify
translucent virtual walls explicitly. For instance, Bob may create an opaque wall around
a room that applies to all users in the system. If he decides later to make a translucent
virtual wall for his family, he could either remove “family” from the apply-set of the
opaque wall, and rely on the default behavior, or explicitly create a translucent wall for
his family. We believe that the latter is less confusing, and so we allow Bob to explicitly
create translucent walls. Furthermore, we are exploring the use of more sophisticated
default modes that depend on the type of place or the type of user; e.g., a “free-minded”
user could have a default transparent wall, or a “paranoid” user may desire a default
opaque policy. Our model also supports “mandatory” system policies, i.e., policies set
by administrators that cannot be overridden by users, but we omit discussion for brevity.
3.2 Group ownership
Some personal footprints in the system record data about a group of people, for instance,
images captured by a camera. We call such footprints with multiple owners, shared
personal footprints. Access to a shared personal footprint thus needs to be protected
by the virtual walls of all the “co-owners,” and access can be granted only if all these
virtual walls permit the access. One could also envision systems in which these co-
owners negotiate a “shared virtual wall” for their shared personal footprints. We leave
the possibility of negotiation of group policies for future work. For now, we assume
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that the system has some way of identifying the group of owners for a shared personal
footprint and applies the most restrictive wall of all the owners.
It is possible that unknown users (e.g., users who are not detected or recognized by
the system) may be present in a shared personal footprint such as an image. Our system
protects the privacy of those users who can be identified in the system; protecting the
privacy of unidentifiable users is outside the scope of this work. Posted signs could
inform such users that “cameras are present and your images may be broadcast over the
network.” In other words, users who are not protected by virtual walls implicitly provide
informed consent by entering places with cameras. Group ownership of footprints is a
powerful concept and Section 5 discusses our thoughts for future work. We now explain
how conflicts arise between different virtual walls and how they are resolved.
3.3 Virtual wall interaction
Since multiple virtual walls can be defined for a place, and places themselves may
overlap, we need to define the semantics of “conflicting” virtual walls. Two virtual walls
conflict if there exists a querier for whom two or more different transparencies apply for
access to a particular digital footprint. These conflicts can occur 1) between different
walls owned by the same user (e.g., if Alice creates both a transparent and a translucent
wall for her family), 2) by an opaque wall of one user that contradicts the transparent
or translucent virtual walls of other users, or 3) between different walls for different
owners for a group-owned personal footprint. For the first case, our framework ensures
that conflicts between walls are resolved at creation time, and users are presented with
feedback on the conflict. When creating a new wall that conflicts with an old wall, the
user is required to choose whether the old or new transparency should be maintained for
the affected users in the apply-set, and therefore conflicting walls for the same owner
cannot exist within the system for the same place. For footprints with multiple origins,
however, the most restrictive wall is applied. For the second case, after all users in the
place have agreed to the creation of the opaque walls, the wall is added to the system. If
access to a general footprint is restricted by an opaque wall, then access to that footprint
is denied, overriding the transparent or translucent walls of the consenting users. For the
third case, the most restrictive wall is used. Users are informed of this conflict (users are
required to carry a device for creating walls and other interaction with the system) so
that they are aware of the restriction placed by the wall of a co-owner of the footprint.
An opaque wall blocks access to the general footprints of all users within a place.
Therefore, we require other users present within the place to collectively agree to the
presence of an opaque wall. There are several possible approaches for such a negotia-
tion based on who should be given priority in the negotiation. The different negotiation
strategies can result in too many, or too few, opaque walls. As such, more work is needed
to identify a reasonable strategy. For now, we assume a simple strategy based on unan-
imous consent. Opaque walls around a place can be removed by a new user entering
that place. Entering users are asked whether they agree to the continued existence of
the opaque wall. If not, the owner(s) of the opaque wall is given a small time window
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(e.g., 5 minutes) after which the opaque wall is removed from the system.6 Therefore,
opaque walls are more effective, and reliably maintained, in places for which the owner
has physical control — such as in an office, or in a reserved meeting room with re-
stricted access. An outsider entering a reserved meeting room can be told to leave the
room before he or she has the opportunity to disable the opaque wall. We are also ex-
ploring the possibility of assigning owners to places (e.g., Alice can be the owner of her
personal office), who can then create opaque walls based on authority.
3.4 Limitations of the model
Virtual walls control all footprints within the personal and general categories uniformly.
Users may want finer-grained control over some footprints (such as location) and spe-
cialized mechanisms could be used in conjunction with virtual walls. We leave such a
hybrid approach to future work. We have also equated the term “footprints” with con-
text in an effort to make the model simple to understand. Our user study found that users
had more difficulty with general footprints than with personal footprints (although the
absolute performance numbers were high for both types of footprint). Perhaps another
term may be better, but “general footprints” seems workable. Our model does not ad-
dress multiple queries — Alice may want to restrict the rate of queries for her personal
footprints. Lastly, in the physical world, Alice can see observers through a transparent
wall and has a sense of her “exposure.” In contrast, our model does not provide Alice
with information about queriers. Such functionality would need to consider the privacy
of queriers as well, and this is an exciting area for future research. It is unclear, however,
how far one should push this analogy — at night, observers outside Alice’s house can
see her through her transparent window, but she may not be able to see them.
4 Evaluation
We built a prototype of our proposed system, including sensors, a context server and
a GUI for creating virtual walls. We designed a user study to test the usability of both
our model and the GUI; specifically, we tested the ease of understanding of the virtual
walls model, the ease of use of the model, and the ease of use of the user interface.
4.1 Study description
We recruited participants using flyers posted around campus, and advertisements on
class and departmental e-mail lists, the student-run newspaper, and the popular so-
cial networking website “Facebook.com.” Participation was not restricted to students,
and was open to all adults in the community. In total we had 23 participants. We did
not record any identifying characteristics such as age or gender, but only asked them
whether they had ever taken a programming class, so as to classify the participants by
computing experience: 9 participants had never taken a Computer Science (CS) class.
6 We note that this “5 minute rule” appears arbitrary, and experimentation is required to identify
a reasonable time window.
10
The study comprised a paper booklet and an interactive component that used our GUI
on a computer. The booklet contained a four-page introduction to pervasive environ-
ments and the virtual-wall system, and three sections of questions as listed below.
1. Testing the ease of understanding of the virtual walls model. This booklet section de-
scribed three different scenarios, where some walls had already been created. In each
scenario, participants were asked six questions about whether particular individuals
would be able to access different types of data. For example, one scenario included
a transparent wall around a dorm room that applied to family members, and asked if
a parent could determine if the participant was awake in their dorm room.
2. Testing the ease of use of the virtual walls model. This booklet section contained three
different scenarios, each with different privacy requirements. Participants were asked
to construct walls (with checkboxes in the booklet) that satisfied these requirements.
For example, they were asked to set up walls around a lunch room that would allow
their friends to query footprints such as what they are eating.
3. Testing the ease of use of the virtual walls user interface. Participants followed “wiz-
ard” dialogs that introduced our GUI, and then performed tasks to create, modify,
or delete walls, where each wall had a maximum of three elements in its apply-set.
In each task the participant was told exactly what kind of wall was required — thus
these tasks only tested the ability to use the GUI. For instance, participants were
asked to set up a transparent wall around a lunch room that applied to friends.
The GUI was implemented using AJAX (Asynchronous JavaScript and XML) so
that it could run in a web browser. It used a three-column interface. The first column,
shown in Figure 4, contained a list of the participant’s current walls, and a dialog box
for creating, modifying or deleting walls. This dialog box contained an input box for
naming walls, a drop-down box for selecting the room to which the wall applied, and
checkboxes to determine transparency or apply-sets. The second interface column con-
tained a map of the area where the walls were being created (in our study, this was
a floor of our CS building). Existing walls were displayed on the map using different
colors for different transparencies, and clicking on particular rooms would allow a par-
ticipant to create or modify walls for that room. The third interface column contained a
description of the task that the participant needed to perform.
The participants took an average of 28.3 minutes to complete the entire study.
4.2 Study results
We now present more detailed results of our study by breaking down the questions in
each section into various categories. For the first two sections, we categorized ques-
tions based on the transparency of the wall in the question’s scenario, and whether the
footprints being accessed were personal or general. For these two sections we define a
“Correct Response” as the case where a participant correctly selects or creates the wall
to which the question refers. The third section of the study only considered the UI, and
so we broke down the questions by the particular UI tasks. For this section a “Correct
Response” is the case where a participant successfully performs the task in question; for
instance, if a participant was asked to create a wall that applied to “Family” but instead
created a wall that applied to “Friends,” this would be an incorrect response.
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Fig. 4. Portion of the virtual walls user interface
Table 1 shows the correct responses in the three sections of the study. Unsurpris-
ingly, participants who had taken a programming class (“CS participants”) performed
better than non-CS participants. All of the successful response rates are high and point
towards a usable model. In the following we break down the results by section.
Table 1. Overall study responses.
Correct responses
Section CS participants non-CS participants
1. Ease of understanding the model 99.4% 90.1%
2. Ease of use of the model 96.3% 90.5%
3. Ease of use of the user interface 97.2% 95.5%
Table 2. Successful responses by topic of question
(a) Section 1, understanding the model
Topic Personal Footprints General Footprints
Transparent 95.7% 91.3%
Translucent 93.5% 88.0%
Opaque 100.0% 95.7%
(b) Section 2, use of the model
Topic Correct responses
Transparent 93.5%
Translucent 94.8%
Opaque 86.96%
Section 1: ease of understanding the model. Table 2(a) shows that participants had
more difficulty with the concept of general footprints than personal footprints. Likewise,
participants had the most difficulty with translucent walls. This was to be expected
— transparent walls allow access to all footprints, and opaque walls restrict access to
all footprints, leaving little room for error. Translucent walls, on the other hand, are
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Table 3. Time to complete interface tasks.
Average (Standard deviation)
time to complete task (seconds)
Section CS participants non-CS participants non-CS (outlier
removed)
3a. Creating a wall 30.4 (13.7) 31.3 (19.2) 27.7 (11.9)
3b. Modifying a wall 11.6 (5.8) 15.1 (21.3) 10.9 (10.4)
3c. Deleting a wall 11.1 (4.2) 11.3 (9.6) 9.3 (4.7)
3d. Resolving a wall conflict 31.4 (11.2) 37.0 (26.2) 34.6 (23.5)
Table 4. Successful responses for interface tasks.
Correct responses
Section CS participants non-CS participants
3a. Creating a wall 94.1% 92.9%
3b. Modifying a wall 100.0% 100.0%
3c. Deleting a wall 100.0% 96.4%
3d. Resolving a wall conflict 100.0% 92.9%
a combination of the two, and showed the highest error rates. In all six categories,
however, the success rates were 88% or more, which point toward a usable model.
Section 2: ease of use of model. With regards to use of the model, it was only practi-
cal to categorize questions by the transparency of the wall that participants were asked
to create (Table 2(b)). While opaque walls were easy to understand when presented to
participants (Table 2(a)), three users did not use opaque walls correctly. A better expla-
nation of opaque walls or a few more training examples might help users avoid such
mistakes. We thus plan to improve our GUI to provide better feedback, e.g., through a
dialog box that says “To block general footprints, you should create an opaque wall.”
After users become familiar with the model, they can choose to suppress such feedback.
Section 3: ease of use of interface. Table 3 shows the time taken to perform various
tasks in the GUI. Resolving conflicts took the longest time, as this requires users to
read a dialog box explaining the conflict, and pick the correct option to resolve the
conflict. Creating a wall took about the same time, as this requires the largest number of
commands: clicking on a room or the “new wall” button, selecting a transparency and
an apply-set (restricted to a maximum of three elements), and clicking the “save wall”
button. Modifying a wall involved changing just one wall element, and thus the times
are similar to those for deleting a wall (which involves just one action to delete). There
is a high variance in the responses for the non-CS participants, most of which can be
explained by one outlier participant who appeared to have trouble with most of the tasks
in the study. We have removed this outlier in the third column of Table 3, but even after
doing so there is a high variance in the times taken to resolve conflicts, as there were two
participants who took a very long time to do this. Even with these outliers, the longest
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task took about half a minute, which we believe makes our current GUI usable (this
was reiterated by the participants’ positive comments as described below). The next
revision of our GUI, however, will concentrate on streamlining the wall-creation and
conflict-resolution processes and incorporating users’ suggestions for improvement.
Overall, participants were able to use the interface successfully (Table 4). There
were two participants that had trouble with creating walls (for example, one user spec-
ified “Family” instead of “Professors” in the apply set), but apart from this the other
mistakes were infrequent and appeared to be random.
User comments. The study offered participants the opportunity to provide feedback
on the system through free-form written comments in the booklet. Many comments
implied that participants would be protective of their personal information in a pervasive
environment. For instance, one noted “Personally, I don’t want people to be able to
search the internet for what I am wearing, eating, etc,” while another said “I’d refuse
to have this kind of software following me.” Within the constraints of our system, one
participant said that “I think the default wall should be opaque in some cases,” while
another generalized by saying that “I think many people would choose ‘opaque’ for
the majority of rooms/situations.” The study helped us recognize that users may want
default opaque walls for personal spaces. Another participant emphasized the need for a
secure system: “[I]n the era of identity theft, there is heightened concern about privacy.
How easy would it be to get someone’s password and reconfigure their Virtual Walls?”
Some comments referenced confusion about the walls concept that was reflected in
participants’ answers to questions in the study. Two users were confused about loca-
tions: one said “I didn’t quite udnerstand (sic) whether one could query about a specific
person without knowing what room they are in” while another was “confused as to lo-
cation and translucent walls — I understand that translucent would mean they could see
people in [the] room but not which people.” This indicates that the query model must
be explained better to users of the system. Comments regarding the GUI itself were
generally positive. Many requested further functionality, such as hotkeys, the ability to
define rooms (for simplicity the GUI used in the study only had predetermined rooms),
or sounds and additional colors to highlight particular events or interface components.
4.3 Limitations of the study
Our study focused on the usability of the virtual wallsmodel. We note that the GUI used
in the study was designed to fit in a web browser on a desktop computer. We need to
further explore scaling this GUI to smaller displays, such as on a mobile phone or PDA.
We believe that our use of standard AJAX technologies should, however, facilitate the
porting of our interface to such devices. It would also be useful to evaluate our model
against other metaphors for usable privacy policies, but we leave this to future work.
5 Discussion and future work
Our user study affirms that the virtual walls model is easy to understand, and users can
effectively translate privacy preferences into policies with virtual walls. For a real-world
deployment, we anticipate the following challenges and opportunities for future work.
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Creating walls: It may be cumbersome for users to constantly think about deploying
virtual walls for every place they visit. A usable system will need to support higher level
rules (in addition to default virtual walls) so that users can create virtual walls for not
only a particular room, but a set of rooms based on certain conditions. For example,
“Transparent wall around all work-related rooms during work hours,” or “Translucent
wall around current room if I am with my spouse.”
Group ownership: A group of users may want to create a shared virtual wall to
control footprints related to the group. For example, a group in a room may negotiate
a shared translucent wall to restrict access to all personal footprints belonging to the
group. Enabling groups to set up walls and negotiate their transparency and apply-set
would require an extension to our model and a usable mechanism for such negotiation.
User disruption: Opaque walls, and possibly group walls in the future, require in-
put from and feedback to users. In places with many users entering and leaving, users
in those places may be disrupted by several messages. To reduce user input, users’ re-
sponses could be automated by using stored preferences.
Data perturbation: It may be desirable to perturb footprints (e.g., changing granu-
larity [9], darkening images [14] or adding “noise” [20]) when using translucent walls.
This approach would be closer to the physical metaphor of translucence.
Mobile places:One can envision mobile places, such as a bus enriched with sensors.
For instance, the bus may be parked inside a building and so be affected by virtual walls
around that building. We would like to explore the semantics of virtual walls for mobile
places, and how they interact with static places.
Deception: User studies in location privacy [15] have identified the need for decep-
tion, where users can lie about their location. Given the broad range of digital footprints
that our framework is targeting, deception may be a challenging task.
6 Related work
Several context-dissemination systems in pervasive computing support access-control
mechanisms for protecting sensitive context information. Dey [7] built an experimental
mechanism to control access to context in the Context Toolkit. The developer of a wid-
get object can specify the “owner” of the information being sensed by implementing a
function that computes the owner of an event. As mentioned earlier, we assume some
such mechanism to infer the owner of a footprint.
While sensor-derived context information is still an active area of research [18,25],
many applications based on context “sensed” from the user’s computer, and systems to
deal with the privacy of context information, are being studied. IBM’s Grapevine ser-
vice provides a user’s context information to other users. A user’s context is computed
by monitoring her activities on her computer, and other users in the system can check
to see her activity before initiating communication. Christensen et al. [5] report that
while other users found it useful to query a user’s context in certain situations, reveal-
ing context was a sensitive issue for most users and they ended up blocking context to
all queriers. Fine-grained access control mechanisms were rarely used. It appears that
in the absence of a usable policy language, users will be burdened by fine-grained poli-
cies, and end up being loathe to part with their (sensitive) context information. A policy
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language that balances ease of use and the granularity of access control is therefore
needed, and our virtual walls system is an attempt to meet this balance.
A context-privacy system similar to ours is the “Digital Territory” project [3]. This
project proposes “bubbles,” which are “a temporary defined space that can be used to
limit the information coming into and leaving the bubble in the digital domain.” Bub-
bles can be shared between individuals and groups, and the flow of information in and
out of the bubble can be adjusted. The bubble is similar to our virtual wall, although
instead of translucency, bubbles offer a larger number of policies, which we believe
will be unmanageable for complex environments. As far as we know, their system has
yet to be implemented, and our translucency concept may prove useful for making the
system usable. The pawS [17] system is also similar to ours — it sends privacy beacons
to users as they enter pervasive environments to inform them of privacy policies. pawS
concentrates on using machine-readable policies, however, while our focus is on poli-
cies that are easy for users to understand. Wickramasuriya et al. [26] examine context
privacy in media spaces. They use RFID tags for localization, and then start monitor-
ing users (through video sensors) only when policy violations occur (such as movement
into a specific area). We anticipate that virtual walls will be used in environments where
sensors are not just used for policy enforcement, and that users may opt for continuous
monitoring due to the perceived benefits of the resulting context-aware applications.
Location is a primary piece of information for context-aware computing, and so
several systems provide access-control mechanisms for location. Geopriv [6] defines a
framework for securely disseminating location data by distributing location objects that
are coupled with privacy rules. Geopriv, does not, however, address how privacy rules
are defined. Hengartner and Steenkiste [12] support two types of authorization policies
for location information: user policies specify who is allowed to access their location
information, while room policies state who has the privilege to identify people in a
particular room. The room policy is similar to virtual walls in that it is associated with
a certain geographical area. Unlike our system, the owner of a room (not the users in
that room) determines the room policy of that room. Other systems such as Confab [13]
and LocServ [19] allow users to specify fine-grained policies to control their location
information. For example, LocServ’s authorization language expresses constraints such
as time, location, and quality of service (i.e., the granularity and anonymity of location
information). As mentioned earlier, we provide a policy language for expressing privacy
policies about all kinds of footprints, of which location is only one example.
We believe that virtual walls will make privacy in pervasive environments more
usable, in particular where large numbers of sensors and users are involved. The idea
of using room or wall-like metaphors has been applied in non-security scenarios, for
instance by Henderson and Card [11]. Similarly, the idea of simplifying privacy policies
into easily-understandable levels has been explored elsewhere, for example, Hawkey
and Inkpen’s “privacy gradients” [10]. Usability in sensor-network scenarios, however,
has been little studied. Barkhuus and Dey examine location-tracking services and find
that users are more concerned about privacy if their location is being tracked, rather than
if the device is simply aware of its own position [1]. Iachello et al. [15] develop and trial
a location-aware application, and produce a set of guidelines for application designers,
which we discussed in Section 5. Finally, Elliot et al. [8] conducted interviews to study
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how households handle communication information at home, and find that people do
attach ownership to information according to the ownership of physical spaces.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we outline the need for an intuitive policy abstraction to address the privacy
of users’ digital footprints in sensor-rich pervasive environments. We believe that most
users will be incapable of specifying complex privacy policies for information sensed
about them, and so an abstraction for this purpose must be easy to understand and use.
To meet these goals, we proposed and evaluated a policy framework that extends the
metaphor of physical walls to pervasive environments. Virtual walls control the spread
of personal and general contextual data, or “footprints,” and offer privacy analogous to
that afforded by physical walls. We formalized the semantics of access control using
virtual walls, and evaluated our model through a user study. Our results indicate that
the model is easy to understand (users can correctly identify the behavior of virtual
walls), and easy to use (users can translate privacy requirements into an appropriate set
of virtual walls). Moreover, comments from study participants indicate that privacy in
sensor-rich environments is an important problem that might affect the deployment of
such environments. Based on our results, we believe that virtual walls are a promising
metaphor for specifying usable privacy policies in pervasive environments.
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